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The nature of the European Union as a polity and its position in re-
lation to sovereign states has sparkled considerable debate among legal1 
and political science2 scholars alike. The intricacies of Brexit serve as a 
vivid example of the difficulties surrounding the nature of the EU.3 At-
tempts to answer this question have markedly been characterised by a 
fallacy that Neil Walker calls ‘the problem of translation’:
Just because the ‘state constitutionalism’ is the default determi-
nant, and because the destination language of ‘non-state con-
stitutionalism’ is under-developed, there is a danger that both 
scholars and actors in the integration process presume an iso-
morphism between the EU and their respective national polities.4
While many others followed suit in recognising this problem,5 it ap-
pears there was a lack of a clear idea that would reboot our understand-
ing of the EU as a constitutional polity.6 It is this gap that Isiksel’s book 
1 See, for example (not in any particular order of relevance), N MacCormick, Questioning 
Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth (OUP 1999); G de Búrca 
and JHH Weiler (eds), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (CUP 2011); N Walker, J 
Shaw and S Tierney (eds), Europe’s Constitutional Mosaic; K Tuori, European Constitutional-
ism (CUP 2015).
2 For a detailed presentation of the dominant theories (neofunctionalism, liberal inter-
governmentalism and multilevel governance), see Mark Pollack, ‘Theorizing the European 
Union: International Organization, Domestic Polity, or Experiment in New Governance?’ 
(2005) 8 Annual Review of Political Science 357; Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (eds), Eu-
ropean Integration Theory (2nd edn, OUP 2009); and Dirk Leuffen, Berthold Rittberger and 
Frank Schimmelfenning, Differentiatied Integration: Explaining Variation in the European 
Union (Palgrave Macmillan 2013).
3 The very centre of the legal question before the UK Supreme Court hearing the appeal 
in R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union is whether the Government 
alone can trigger article 50 TEU in order to start its exit from the EU (meaning that exit from 
the EU is to be considered concluding an international treaty), or whether it will change the 
law of the land (thus warranting Parliamentary scrutiny and consent). The question can 
hardly be settled if we remain in the domestic/international dichotomy, explaining (at least 
in part) why the case has been given so much constitutional importance.
4 N Walker, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation’ in JHH Weiler 
and M Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (CUP 2003) 40.
5 J Shaw, ‘Process and Constitutional Discourse in the European Union’ (2000) 27 J Law 
& Soc 4, 20; Renaud Dehousse, ‘Beyond Representative Democracy: Constitutionalism in 
a Polycentric Polity’ in JHH Weiler and M Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond 
the State (CUP 2003) 136; N Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism – The Pluralist Structure of 
Postnational Law (OUP 2010) 35ff. In the political science literature, see also I Bache and M 
Flinders (eds), Multi-Level Governance (OUP 2004) 78.
6 For a recent attempt to reconceptualise the EU constitutional vocabulary, see M Dawson 
and F de Witte Dawson, ‘Self-determination in the Constitutional Future of the EU’ (2015) 
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aims to fill, by reconceptualising the notion of constitutionalism in the 
EU context. In particular, Isiksel aims to interpret and criticise (p 7) the 
normative values that have guided the EU’s normative structure, through 
its idiosyncratic constitutional practice. The analysis of constitutional 
theory that precedes the creation of an EU constitutional vocabulary 
shows great caution towards the proper use of the term ‘constitutional-
ism’, warning against an extensive and unwarranted conceptual renova-
tion in new institutional contexts (p 2). 
With these premises in mind, Isiksel’s main contribution is the intro-
duction of the notion of functional constitutionalism, through which she 
aims to capture the teleological legitimation behind the European project, 
as opposed to liberal and democratic principles that generally lie behind 
state constitutional systems (p 27). The notion is introduced following a 
detailed analysis of the genesis of the European project, its initial and 
core aims which lie in economic prosperity, and the guarantee of peace 
among the founding Member States, which have conditioned a particu-
lar type of constitutional legitimation. The book starts from the prem-
ise that the EU itself was built from the viewpoint of mistrust towards 
‘populist mobilisation and national sovereignty’ (p 12), which conditioned 
the creation of different types of processes and institutions at the Euro-
pean level that sourced their legitimacy on competence and pragmatism, 
rather than popular support. The main argument of the book is that 
the economic rationale that has originally driven European integration is 
still at the centre of its legal and institutional structure,7 resulting in a 
lack of democratic control of issues that were previously handled at the 
domestic level (such as human rights, citizenship, migration policy and 
non-discrimination, p 19). 
In this context, Isiksel seeks to define functional constitutionalism by 
first characterising constitutionalism as a ‘system of public institutions 
whose powers are so extensive as to constitute a discrete political com-
munity, without, however, stipulating as a definitional matter that any 
constitutional system properly so-called must be configured in line with 
strong democratic principles’ (p 71). In addition, she turns to the term 
functional, which she instantly seeks to differentiate from the functional-
ism and neofunctionalism as ideas of comparative constitutionalism. The 
term functional for the purposes of the book, and the emergence of a new 
EU-specific constitutional vocabulary, refers to a system (1) where the 
EU powers are functionally limited, unlike state sovereign power which 
is horizontal and absolute; (2) which embraces a detailed teleology in 
21(3) European Law Journal 371; M Dawson and F de Witte, ‘From Balance to Conflict: A 
New Constitution for the EU’ (2016) 22(2) European Law Journal, 204.
7 Perhaps most vividly explained in relation to the different mechanisms introduced in 
order to tackle the economic and financial crisis, 224-230.
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comparison to national constitutional systems, relying on the goal of the 
economic union over democratic contestation; (3) the legitimacy of which 
depends on the successful discharge of these aims, rather than any type 
of democratic legitimation present in nation states (p 78). Drawing upon 
the tradition of constitutional pluralism, the author convincingly argues 
for a co-existence of the EU’s functionally limited powers and the Member 
States’ absolute constitutions, claiming that they can operate when their 
relationship is understood as ‘intersectional, heterarchical, and pluralis-
tic, rather than exclusive, comprehensive, hierarchical, and monistic’ (p 
81).
The book then turns to exploring this idea further through four sub-
stantive chapters that explore areas of constitutional rule that tradition-
ally do not follow market logic, but which have been repurposed through 
EU action. In particular, Chapter 3 explores the EU’s regime of funda-
mental rights, and, more specifically, their relation to and difference from 
fundamental freedoms, which form the peculiar EU-based rights in the 
case law of the Court of Justice. The argument of the chapter, under-
lining economic teleology as dominant in the EU’s constitution, is that 
fundamental freedoms are constitutionally foundational, whereas fun-
damental rights are purely auxiliary (p 122). While the EU could bolster 
its legitimacy through increased safeguards in the area of protection of 
fundamental rights, the author is critical of its reluctance to do so (p 114 
onwards). 
Chapter 4 explores the manner in which citizenship has been treat-
ed and safeguarded in the EU. Specifically, Isiksel argues that aside from 
the EU’s troubles in increasing citizen participation, it is lacking in en-
suring equal political participation through reinforcing functional consti-
tutionalism logic (p 130). Models of participation are strongly connected 
and restricted to the advancement of market integration, thus failing 
substantively to ensure that the voices of those who do not share the 
same goals are equally heard. This lack of equal participation results in a 
failure of the EU to provide for democratic contestation of both its basic 
aims and more individual policies. 
Chapter 5 discusses free movement and how it conditions the scope 
of EU citizenship and its political significance. The author warns against 
an overreliance on the significance of mobility and how it has affected the 
position of supranational citizenship (p 167). She concludes by stating 
that as long as supranational citizenship is tied to mobility, it can hardly 
achieve the universality necessary for full and equal civic participation in 
the EU.
Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the principle of non-discrimination and 
its expansion into areas of exclusive Member State competence. The au-
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thor finds that, unlike the three areas addressed in previous chapters, 
the principle of non-discrimination is capable of being a more compre-
hensive political project than market integration (pp 186-187). Neverthe-
less, the way it has been applied in the EU demonstrates a lack of univer-
sal inclusion and equal treatment, relying predominantly, as explained in 
Chapter 5, on personal mobility, resulting in a restricted scope. The au-
thor concludes that the principle of non-discrimination has itself resulted 
in discriminatory effects, towards third-country nationals and towards 
immobile EU citizens (p 199).
Besides the obvious contribution of this book to further the debate 
on the nature of the EU’s constitution, critics may find that the wish of 
the book to cater to research of both law and political science falls short. 
At times, the analysis in the substantive chapters may leave legal aca-
demics and researchers somewhat disappointed, as it focuses mainly on 
the political aspects of particular issues under analysis,8 and could ben-
efit from a more nuanced analysis of the consequences that took place in 
the case law of the Court of Justice, and in EU legislation. Furthermore, 
the book in its aims restricts itself to interpretation and criticism, with-
out normative prescriptions (p 7). While this particular project would be 
overly ambitious to include also a normative framework or at least insight 
into a desirable shift towards improvement, the reader is left somewhat 
unsatisfied. In particular, the book finishes with the following statement: 
‘Economic union does not exhaust the horizons of the European project, 
but the challenge remains that of bringing those horizons into focus’ (p 
232). We are left wondering which horizons are to be included, how and 
why, for the EU to achieve its full constitutional potential. 
More importantly, nevertheless, the innovative approach to defining 
the EU constitution and its intricacies renders this an important con-
tribution to any academic interested in the EU, but also in the broader 
questions related to constitutionalism beyond the State.
             Ana Bobić
Faculty of Law, University of Oxford
8 See, for example, section I of Chapter 4 concerning the analysis of citizen participation 
as a mode of democratic legitimation, 131-152.
